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The lesson to be learned from the progression of case law and the legal
principles to follow is that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole
for a juvenile offender is presumptively wrong. Children are different than
adults and those differences counsel against a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. Youth has constitutional significance, and unless a
juvenile offender suffers from "irreparable corruption,"' a sentence of life
2
without the possibility of parole is improper.
I.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive bonds imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 3 As Justice Hearn wrote for the
majority in Aiken v. Byars:4
Although the earliest Eighth Amendment cases focused on the
barbarous nature of punishment, the jurisprudence evolved to

*
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014).

499

Published by Scholar Commons,

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [], Art. 9
500

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 499

encompass challenges to the proportionality of the sentence to the
offense. When considering whether a sentence is proportional, the
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the scope of
the Eighth Amendment is not static, but "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 5
The need for individualized sentencing, with consideration of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, has its genesis in American death penalty
jurisprudence. In Furman v. Georgia,6 the United States Supreme Court held
the death penalty to be violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments
when death sentences were imposed under statutes that left juries with
"untrammeled discretion" to impose or withhold the death penalty. 7 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all people
convicted of rapes and murder in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in
fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that,
if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be
sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of
race. But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to
one side. I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia that
the death penalty was being arbitrarily and capriciously imposed on an
unlucky few, some states, including South Carolina, enacted statutory
schemes making the death penalty mandatory for all persons convicted of

5.
Id. at 538, 765 S.E.2d at 574 (citations omitted) (citing and quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170-72 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7.
Id. at 247-49, 265 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971),
vacated408 U.S. 941 (1972)).
8.
Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (internal citations
omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss3/9

2

Dudek: A Meaningful Opportunity for Release: Resentencing Hearings for J
2017]

RESENTENCING HEARINGS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS

501

murder.9 However, in Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v.
Louisiana," the United States Supreme Court held North Carolina and
Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statutes which did not allow for
consideration of the character and the record of the individual offender or
the circumstances of the particular offense were inconsistent with the
fundamental respect for humanity that underlies the Eighth Amendment.12
Three weeks later, in State v. Rumsey,1 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court,
following the holdings in Woodson and Roberts, held that our state's
mandatory death penalty statute was unconstitutional.14
Conversely, in Gregg v. Georgia,5 which was decided the same day as
Woodson and Roberts, the Supreme Court found that Georgia's statutory
death penalty statutory complex was constitutional. 1 Georgia's statutory
scheme provided for a guilt phase and a separate penalty phase in a
bifurcated trial, when the judge or jury heard additional extenuating or
mitigating evidence.' 7 It allowed for evidence in aggravation of punishment
only if made known to the defendant before trial. In short, the Georgia
statutory scheme allowed focused attention on the character of the defendant
and the circumstances of the crime.19
Further, one of ten specific statutory aggravating circumstances had to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and designated in writing before a
20
death sentence could be imposed. Moreover, the state supreme court had to
consider whether the death sentence was the result of passion, prejudice, or
other arbitrary factors before the state supreme court could affirm the death
sentence, and it also had to conduct a proportionality review, and identify
21
other similar cases in which death was imposed.
Gregg v. Georgia was the first of a line of cases mandating that
mitigating evidence and extenuating circumstances had to be considered in

9.
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (North Carolina);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (Louisiana); State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 226
S.E.2d 894 (1976) (South Carolina).
10. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
11. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
12. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.
13. 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976).
14. Id. at 239, 226 S.E.2d at 895.
15. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16. Id. at 207.
17. Id. at 163.
18. Id. at 164.
19. Id.
20. Id. The State could also introduce additional non-statutory evidence in aggravation
that was probative of the defendant's character. Id.
21. Id. at 153, 198.
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capital cases. In 1977, South Carolina adopted the Georgia death penalty
22
statutory scheme virtually in its entirety. As will be discussed, the plenary
evidentiary nature of the penalty phase would likewise be argued as the
template for sentencing of juveniles facing life without parole.
Later in 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,23 a plurality of the Supreme
Court had determined that national standards of decency did not permit the
24
execution of any offender under age sixteen at the time of the crime. The
25
very next year, however, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court concluded, in a
5-4 decision, that the Eighth Amendment did not proscribe the execution of
26
offenders over fifteen but under eighteen.
The Stanford Court reasoned
that twenty-two of thirty-seven death penalty states permitted that penalty
for sixteen-year-old offenders, and twenty-five states permitted a seventeenyear-old to be eligible for capital punishment, thereby indicating there was
27
no national consensus.
Concurrently, the same day Stanford was decided, the Supreme Court
held in Penry v. Lynaugh28 that the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a
categorical exemption from the death penalty for mentally retarded persons
29
because only two states had enacted laws banning such executions.
However, thirteen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia,30 the Supreme Court held
the execution of mentally retarded criminal defendants was cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, thus abrogating
Penry.31 The majority in Atkins noted that a punishment is excessive, and
therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, if it is not graduated and
32
proportioned to the offense. In other words, an excessiveness claim is

22. See Act No. 177, 1977 S.C. Acts 407-12; State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 199, 255
S.E.2d 799, 802 (1979) (noting the Act "was patterned after the death penalty statutes of our
sister state Georgia"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406
S.E.2d 315 (1991).
23. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
24. Id. at 818-38.
25. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
26. Id. at 361.
27. Id. at 370-71.
28. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
29. Id. at 334. However, the Penry Court also held that the absence of instructions
informing the Texas jury that it could consider and give effect to the petitioner's mitigating
evidence of mental retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death
penalty compels the conclusion that the jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its
"reasoned moral response" to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision, as is required
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982), and subsequent decisions. Id. at 328.
30. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
31. Id.at321.
32. Id. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
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judged by current prevailing standards of decency and a proportionality
review under such evolving standards of decency "should be informed by
objective factors to the maximum possible extent." 33
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons 34 held that the
execution of individuals who are under eighteen years of age at the time of
their capital crimes was prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
35
36
amendments, abrogating Stanford. The next year in State v. Morgan, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held a seventeen-year-old defendant, whose
death sentence had to be vacated under Roper, was entitled to present
evidence on remand for resentencing that he was entitled to a sentence less
than life imprisonment.37
38
Thereafter, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that life
without parole sentences imposed on juveniles convicted of non-homicide
offenses violated the Eighth Amendment. 39 Later, in Miller v. Alabama,40
two fourteen-year-old defendants appealed their mandatory sentences of life
without parole following convictions for capital murder. 4' After granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment also forbade
sentences of mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juvenile
42
homicide offenders. In its opinion, the Miller Court observed that Graham
equated life without parole sentences for juveniles to the death penalty. 43 It
therefore required the sentencing authority to consider the individual
characteristics of the juvenile sentence and the details of his offense prior to
imposing the sentence, just as it had barred the mandatory imposition of
capital punishment for murder.44
Both Roper and Graham established that children were constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Juveniles have diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform. Therefore, the Court explained,

33. Id. at 312 (quoting and citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)).
34. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
35. Id. at 574.
36. 367 S.C. 615, 626 S.E.2d 888 (2006).
37. Id. at 618-19, 626 S.E.2d at 889.
38. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
39. Id. at 82.
40. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
41. Id. at 2460.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2458.
44. Id
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"they are less deserving of the most severe punishments." 45 The Court
observed the following on the lessened culpability of children:
First, children have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility," leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and
heedless risk-taking.

Second, children "are more vulnerable .

.

. to

negative influences and outside pressures," including from their
family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over their own
environment" and lack the ability to extricate themselves from
horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child's character is
not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his
actions less likely to be "evidence of irretrievable depravity." 46
Miller further emphasized that, in Roper and Graham, the Court had
explained that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even
when they commit terrible crimes.4 7 Given that the heart of retribution
related to an offender's blameworthiness, the Court said the case for
retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult, since immaturity,
recklessness, and impetuosity made minors less likely to consider potential
criminal punishment before committing reckless and immature crimes.4 8
In reaching its decision, the Miller Court also looked to Eddings v.
Oklahoma,49 which held that the sentencing authority had to consider and
give weight to the conditions of youth as a time of immaturity,
irresponsibility, impetuousness, and recklessness.50 In Eddings, a sixteenyear-old killed a police officer, and the trial judge had refused, as a matter of
law, to consider in mitigation the circumstances of the minor's unhappy
upbringing and emotional disturbance, and found that the only mitigating
circumstance was the petitioner's youth, which circumstance was held to be
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 5' The Eddings Court
noted that "youth was more than a chronological fact" and that its signature
52
qualities are all transient. Therefore, the Court vacated the defendant's

45. Id. at 2463 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010)).
46. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)).
47. Id. at 2465.
48. Id.
49. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
50. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115).
51. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105-06, 108.
52. Id at 114.
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death sentence because it was imposed without "the type of individualized
consideration of mitigating factors ... required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments in capital cases."53
Most importantly, the Miller Court laid out certain evidence that a
sentencer is required to consider with juvenile offenders: (1) the
chronological age of the offender and the hallmark features of youth,
including "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks and
consequence"; (2) the "family and home environment" that surrounded the
offender; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent
of the offender's participation in the conduct and how familial and peer
pressures may have affected him; (4) the "incompetencies associated with
youth for example, [the offender's] inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the offender's] incapacity to
assist his own attorneys"; and (5) the "possibility of rehabilitation." 54
II.

AIKEN V. BYARS

In light of Miller, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed on October
29, 2012, in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court in
the case of Aiken v. Byars, requesting that the court set procedures for
resentencing a class of approximately thirty-six individuals who were then
serving life sentences in the Department of Corrections for crimes they
committed before they reached the age of eighteen.5 5 The petition also asked
that the court set procedures for future sentencing hearings for minors facing
a potential sentence of life without parole:
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Miller v. Alabama, petitioners submit that it is incumbent upon this
Court to grant certiorari and establish both a constitutionally
appropriate remedy for the petitioners and others similarly situated
(i.e., a new sentencing hearing), and constitutionally adequate
procedures for sentencing hearings in cases where juveniles either
have been sentenced to, or face a possible sentence of, life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. As will be explained
in more detail later in this petition, Miller held that mandatory
sentences of life without parole, when imposed upon juveniles,
violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 105 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978)).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2015 WL 738556, at *1.
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Additionally, while reserving the question whether juveniles may
ever be sentenced to life without parole, the High Court also created
a presumption against a sentence of life without parole for juveniles
and explicitly imported Eighth Amendment capital sentencing
principles into cases where juveniles face the possibility of a
sentence of life without parole. Just as "death is different" when
imposed upon an adult offender, life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is different when imposed upon a juvenile.
Given this fundamental change in the relevant legal landscape,
juveniles who have been sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole in South Carolina are entitled to be resentenced in a manner
consistent with Miller's requirement of individualized sentencing
and the "distinct set of legal rules" now applicable in juvenile
homicide cases. The circuit courts of this state are therefore in need
of guidance as to how to proceed in cases where a juvenile offender
faces the possibility of a life without parole sentence. Because the
questions presented in these cases are not only of grave importance,
but also involve issues which must be resolved in these and other
cases pending at trial, on direct appeal and in post-conviction
56
proceedings, certiorariis especially appropriate.
The named petitioners in Aiken v. Byars were the following:
Tyrone Aiken was a seventeen-year-old with mental retardation at
the time he took part in the armed robbery and murder for which he
was sentenced to life without parole.
Matthew Clark was seventeen years old at the time of the offense.
He was convicted of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to life
without parole in connection with the death of his twenty-two-yearold girlfriend's three-year-old daughter.
Eric Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a murder
committed when he was seventeen years old. The victim was
Graham's girlfriend, and she died of a single gunshot wound;
according to Graham, the gun went off accidentally while the two of
them were watching a movie. There was no evidence of a fight or a
disagreement presented at trial.

56.

Id. at *1-2 (citations omitted).
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Bradford Haigler was a seventeen-year-old high school junior with
no criminal record at the time of the homicide for which he was
sentenced to life without parole. The victim, John Bovain, was a
member of a group known to police as the "Edisto Boys."
Angelo Ham was fifteen years old at the time of his offense; his
two codefendants were seventeen and nineteen. Despite a
psychologist's recommendation that the case remain in family court
in light of his troubled childhood and IQ in the 70s, Ham was
transferred to adult court, where he pled guilty.
J'Corey Hull-Kilgore was seventeen years old at the time of the
shooting for which he was sentenced to life without parole. The
victim died from a single gunshot wound. Hull-Kilgore's
codefendants, ages twenty-two and twenty-four, each pled guilty
and received suspended sentences.
Damian Inman was seventeen years old and had no prior criminal
record at the time he took part, along with his older brother and a
friend, in the armed robbery and homicide of Mary Alice Stutts.
Prior to sentencing Inman to life without parole, the trial judge
remarked that he and his codefendants were "no different than those
folks that flew planes into the towers in New York."
Roger Legette was fifteen years old and had no prior criminal
record when he was convicted of murder and sentenced to life
without parole. Legette shot a cab driver after a heated argument,
and then called the police and told them what he had done.
Terriel Mack was seventeen years old at the time of the homicide
for which he was sentenced to life without parole. His two
codefendants, Islam Hom and Gregory Johnson, pled guilty and
testified against Mack. In exchange for their cooperation with
prosecutors, they were each sentenced to less than two years.
Jennifer McSharry was a seventeen-year-old girl with no prior
record and a drug habit cultivated by her own mother when she
accompanied four people, including her mother, during an attempt
to obtain money from the victim. It has never been disputed that
McSharry was outside, in a car, at the time the victim was killed
inside his camping trailer ... After remarking on McSharry's
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apparent lack of "any Christian bringing-up," the trial court
sentenced her to life without parole.
Wallace Priester turned fifteen years old only ten days before the
crime for which he was sentenced to life in prison without parole.
He had no prior criminal record before becoming involved with his
eighteen-year-old codefendant.
Davon Reed was sentenced to life without parole for a murder
committed when he was seventeen years old. As a result of his
mother's chronic addiction to crack cocaine, much of Reed's
childhood was spent in a series of foster placements. At sentencing,
the judge remarked that "age is really no consequence, considering
the nature of offense. Society has nothing left to give Reed than to
lock him up."
Dondre Scott was seventeen years old at the time of the botched
armed robbery and subsequent murder of an elderly man that
resulted in his sentence of life without parole. He had no prior
criminal record. Scott fired one shot that struck the victim under his
arm and killed him. His twenty-five-year-old co-defendant,
Sylvester Davis, had an extensive criminal record and was the
person who initiated the shooting.
Edgar Leron Thomas pled guilty but mentally ill to avoid the
death penalty for a murder and armed robbery committed when he
was seventeen years old. Thomas has brain damage, and has been
diagnosed with multiple mental illnesses, including chronic
paranoid schizophrenia.
James Vang was fifteen years old when he accompanied an older
codefendant, Ae Kingratsaiphon, during a botched armed robbery of
a video poker parlor ... Although a wealth of mitigating evidence
was available, none was presented, and the trial court sentenced
Vang to life without parole.

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a 3-2
opinion, held the following:

57.

Id at 4-6.
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We recognize that in holding the Eighth Amendment proscribes a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility
of parole for juvenile offenders, the Court did not expressly extend
its ruling to states such as South Carolina whose sentencing scheme
permits a life without parole sentence to be imposed on a juvenile
offender but does not mandate it. Indeed, the Court noted that
because its holding was sufficient to decide the cases before it,
consideration of the defendants' alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole
for juveniles was unnecessary. However, we must give effect to the
proportionality rationale integral to Miller's holding youth has
constitutional significance. As such, it must be afforded adequate
weight in sentencing.
Thus, we profoundly disagree with the position advanced by the
respondents and the dissent that the import of the Miller decision
has no application in South Carolina. Miller is clear that it is the
failure of a sentencing court to consider the hallmark features of
youth prior to sentencing that offends the Constitution. Contrary to
the dissent's interpretation, Miller does more than ban mandatory
life sentencing schemes for juveniles; it establishes an affirmative
requirement that courts fully explore the impact of the defendant's
juvenility on the sentence rendered.
The supreme court also noted it recognized that, while some of the
sentencing proceedings of the petitioners in this case touched "on the issues
of youth, none of them approach the sort of hearing envisioned by Miller
where the factors of youth are carefully and thoughtfully considered." 59
Indeed, the vast majority of "hearings" for these petitioners were typical of
the summary sentencing proceedings in this state, and were not "sentencing
hearings" in the sense many lawyers consider. That is not a criticism, it is
merely the reality of sentencing in this state.
In South Carolina, a pre-sentencing report is highly unusual. A statute
allows for the report if "the services of a probation officer are available to
the court," and before a judge can give probation to a defendant for a
felony.6o A judge also has the statutory authority, and duty, to order a
presentence investigation when the judge has reason to believe the defendant

58. Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 542-43, 765 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2014) (citation
omitted).
59. Id. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-420 (2007).
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he or she is preparing to sentence is mentally retarded, suffers from a mental
,61
disorder, or has a "substantial handicap."
A normal sentencing proceeding occurs immediately after the guilty
verdict. It usually consists of the defendant's new trial motion being denied.
The solicitor normally informs the trial judge of the defendant's prior
criminal record, and other facts the State considers aggravating in the case.
The solicitor commonly tells the judge what sentence the State thinks should
be imposed: "The maximum sentence," "a substantial sentence," or "a
sentence which reflects the fact the defendant has forfeited his right to live
among us."
Subsequently, defense counsel gives a brief oral case in mitigation,
which can include the defendant's youth, his relative involvement in the
crime, and any facts of the defendant's life that counsel finds mitigating,
e.g., the defendant was a good cooperating client, the defendant's
participation in his church, his lack of a prior criminal record, and any good
deeds he has done in the community. Additionally, the defendant's family
members or friends can be heard from briefly. It is the extremely rare case
where any mental health expert or mitigation social worker is heard from
during the brief sentencing proceeding.
The sentencing judge will also hear from the victim's family and friends
about the impact of the crime upon their lives and what sentence they think
should be imposed. A typical sentencing hearing will rarely be more than ten
transcript pages at the conclusion of the trial. Most sentencing judges are
brief in their explanation for their sentences, if he or she offers one at all.
In discussing the "appropriate procedure" for sentencing defendants
who committed their crime while under the age of eighteen, the supreme
court in Aiken reiterated the five Miller factors previously enumerated in
Part I, supra.62 As for future "sentencing phase hearings" for young
offenders properly being conducted as a death penalty sentencing phase, the
majority in Aiken concluded:
While we do not go so far as some commentators who suggest that
the sentencing of a juvenile offender subject to a life without parole
sentence should mirror the penalty phase of a capital case, we are
mindful that the Miller Court specifically linked the individualized
sentencing requirements of capital sentencing to juvenile life
without parole sentences. Thus, the type of mitigating evidence

61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-23-120 (2009).
62. Aiken, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2468 (2012)).
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permitted in death penalty sentencing hearings unquestionably has
relevance to juvenile life without parole sentencing hearings, in
addition to the factors illustrated above.
Without question, the judge may still determine that life without
parole is the appropriate sentence in some of these cases in light of
other aggravating circumstances. Our General Assembly has made
the decision that juvenile offenders may be sentenced to life without
parole, and we honor that decision. However, Miller requires that
before a life without parole sentence is imposed upon a juvenile
offender, he must receive an individualized hearing where the
63
mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored.
The South Carolina Supreme Court mandated that any individual
affected by its holding had one year from the filing of the opinion to file a
motion for resentencing in the court of general sessions where he or she was
64
originally sentenced. In his concurring opinion, then Justice Pleicones
noted that Miller did not require resentencing for juveniles who received
discretionary life without parole sentences and wrote that, although "the
majority exceeds the scope of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in
ordering relief under Miller, I would reach the same result under S.C. Const.
art. I, § 15."6
As sensed by Justice Pleicones, the South Carolina Attorney General's
Office sought certiorari in Aiken from the United States Supreme Court,
asserting Miller held the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life
without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide, but did not
prohibit or otherwise create a presumption against nonmandatory life
66
without parole sentences. Moreover, the State argued the supreme court
erred in giving Miller retroactive effect and that each juvenile petitioner was
provided an individualized sentencing proceeding with the opportunity to
present mitigating evidence in regard to his or her age and the circumstances
67
of the crime. The brief in opposition to the State's petition argued the
supreme court properly applied Miller, and the plurality's application of the

63. Id. at 544-45, 765 S.E.2d at 577-78 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578.
65. Id. at 545-46, 765 S.E.2d at 578 (Pleicones, J., concurring). Article I, section 15 of
the South Carolina Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that no "cruel, nor corporal, nor
unusual punishment [may] be inflicted." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
66.
67.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2015 WL 738556.
Id
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principles set forth in Miller did not offend any federal rule of non68
retroactivity.
The South Carolina Supreme Court stayed its opinion in Aiken pending
a decision by the United States Supreme Court. On June 1, 2015, the United
69
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. In an order dated July 23, 2015,
the South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petitioners' motion to vacate
the stay, and it allowed the petitioners and any other individual affected by
the opinion in Aiken to file a motion for resentencing in the county of the
original sentence by July 23, 2016.
On March 16, 2016, Chief Justice Costa Pleicones issued an
administrative order mandating that clerks of court forward motions for
resentencing to South Carolina
Court Administration.70
Court
Administration was then ordered to make recommendations to the Chief
Justice for the assignment of a resentencing judge.7 ' The order provided that
"[t]he assigned judge shall be given exclusive jurisdiction to handle that case
from beginning to end." 72 Additionally, the order stated that the original
sentencing judge should not be appointed.73 Further, the appointment of
counsel for an indigent petitioner was first to be attempted through the local
public defender's office. 74 As of the writing of this Article, there are thirtysix known individuals who have filed motions for resentencing, and judges
have been appointed in accordance with the Chief Justice's administrative
order.
At these resentencing hearings, there are there several principles that
should serve as the foundation for resentencing, and subsequent case law
supports them. First, there should never be a juvenile life without parole
sentence without a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the minor suffers
from "irreparable corruption." One factor that weighs against a finding of
"irreparable corruption" is the juvenile defendant having an intellectual
disability. The most obvious of these would seem to be mental retardation as
in Atkins, in which the Supreme Court held that it violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments to execute the mentally
retarded. Until Atkins, mental retardation was only a statutory mitigating

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2015 WL 4072218.
135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015), cert. denied.
Administrative Order No. 2016-03-16-01 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 16, 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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76

circumstance in South Carolina. However, there appears little reason why
other intellectual disabilities such as autism, personality disorders, and
mental illness should not soon join the prohibition.
In addition, until Roper was decided by the United States Supreme
Court, a defendant "being below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime"
was only a statutory mitigating circumstance.77 Other statutory mitigating
circumstances the jury could also consider on par with the fact the defendant
was a minor at the time of the murder were:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
conviction involving the use of violence against another person; (2)
The murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of mental or emotional disturbance; (3) The victim was a
participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; (4)
The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor; (5) The
defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person; (6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired; (7) The age or
mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime; (8) The
defendant was provoked by the victim into committing the
murder.

There should be no reason these statutory mitigating circumstances
should not be deemed relevant during future juvenile resentencing hearings.
Another consideration which also militates against "irreparable
corruption"-is lack of any prior convictions. The same is true of offenses
committed by a group when it appears to the resentencing judge that the
crime was the result of "peer pressure," which is a fundamental
manifestation of youth.
Yet another factor strongly weighing against a finding of "irreparable
corruption" exists when the juvenile defendant had insufficient participation
in the crime. For example, the juvenile defendant was the "non-triggerman,"
such as the "getaway driver" or the "lookout." In another analogy to death
penalty law, the sentencing judge must be able to consider any "mitigating

76.
77.
78.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (2015).
Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(9).
Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1)-(8).
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evidence" that is relevant to a finding the juvenile offender does not suffer
from "irreparable corruption."
III. RECENT CASE LAW

In 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v.
Louisiana,79 which

found that Miller created

a substantive

rule

of

constitutional law, and thus, had retroactive effect for juvenile offenders
under mandatory life without parole sentences.so In Montgomery, the
petitioner, Henry Montgomery, killed a sheriffs deputy in Louisiana in
1963. He was originally tried and sentenced to death.82 However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court granted Montgomery a new trial.83 Montgomery
was re-tried and the jury returned a verdict of guilty without "capital
punishment."84 Under Louisiana law, the verdict required the trial court to
impose a sentence of life without parole. Since the automatic life without
parole sentence was imposed, Montgomery had no opportunity to present
86*
mitigating evidence to justify a less severe sentence. That mitigating
evidence might have included "Montgomery's young age at the time of the
crime; expert testimony regarding his limited capacity for foresight, selfdiscipline, and judgment; and his potential for rehabilitation.", 7 At the time
of the Court's opinion, Montgomery was sixty years old and maintained that
he had been a model prisoner after spending nearly his entire life in prison.
The Supreme Court again noted that the starting premise was that
children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.8 Those differences result from children's diminished capacity
and greater prospects for reform as first enumerated in Roper and Miller.90
After finding it had jurisdiction to hear Montgomery's case on collateral
review, the Supreme Court declared that Miller had retroactive effect. 91 The
Court also suggested that states would not be forced to relitigate cases

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
Id. at 736.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 733 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012)).
Id. at 736.
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involving juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory life sentences as long
92
as they permitted the offenders to be considered for parole.
93
In Tatum v. Arizona, Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the decision to
grant, vacate, and remand several juvenile life without parole sentences,
wrote that based upon the records before the Court, none of the sentencing
judges had addressed the question that Miller and Montgomery required a
sentencer to ask: "whether the petitioner was among the very rarest of
juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect their permanent
incorrigibility." 94 Justice Sotomayor summarized the cases before the Court:
Take Najar v. Arizona. There, the sentencing judge identified as
mitigating factors that the defendant was "16 years of age" and
"emotionally and physically immature." He said no more on this
front. He then discounted the petitioner's efforts to rehabilitate
himself as "nothing significant," despite commending him for those
efforts and expressing hope that they would continue. The
sentencing judge did not evaluate whether Najar represented the
"rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity
that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified."
Purcell v. Arizona, is no different. The sentencing judge found that
Purcell's age at the time of his offense-16 years old qualified as
a statutory mitigating factor. He then minimized the relevance of
Purcell's troubled childhood, concluding that "this case sums up the
result of defendant's family environment: he became a doublemurderer at age 16. Nothing more need be said." So here too, the
sentencing judge did not undertake the evaluation that Montgomery
requires. He imposed a sentence of life without parole despite
finding that Purcell was "likely to do well in the structured
environment of a prison and that he possesses the capacity to be
meaningfully rehabilitated."
The other petitions are similar. In Tatum v. Arizona and DeShaw v.
Arizona, the sentencing judge merely noted age as a mitigating
circumstance without further discussion. In Arias v. Arizona, the
record before us does not contain a sentencing transcript or order
reflecting the factors the sentencing judge considered. It is clear

92.
93.
94.

Id.
137 S. Ct. 11 (2016).
Id. at 12 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734).
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after Montgomery that the Eighth Amendment requires more than
mere consideration of a juvenile offender's age before the
imposition of a sentence of life without parole. It requires that a
sentencer decide whether the juvenile offender before it is a child
"whose crimes reflect transient immaturity" or is one of "those rare
children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption" for whom a
life without parole sentence may be appropriate. There is thus a
very meaningful task for the lower courts to carry out on remand. 95

Thus, again, it is not enough for the resentencing court to allow for
mitigating evidence of the minor's childhood, mental state, mental
deficiencies, peer pressure, and other circumstances of the crime. The court
must also consider that evidence before imposing the resentence.
IV. CONCLUSION

Resentencing courts must be aware the resentenced defendant is entitled
to a meaningful opportunity for release from prison one day, unless it falls
within the rare case in which the state can prove "irreparable corruption."
This means that their life expectancy as a prisoner must be taken account. It
would be erroneous to use life tables or an actuarial based on a person who
is not incarcerated given the known stressors of prison life. Present research
being conducted reveals that an eighteen-year-old young man of any race
would live 37.3 years in the Department of Corrections, and thus, can be
expected to die at fifty-five.96 An eighteen-year-old black young man could
expect to live 38.2 years in the Department of Corrections and be expected
to die at the age of fifty-six. Whether a meaningful statistical difference
exists based upon the race of an inmate is well beyond the expertise of the
author. As early as 1948, our supreme court has recognized that a "de facto"
life sentence is not warranted when a "de jure" sentence is improper. 97
As for the approximately thirty-six resentencing hearings expected after
Aiken, they are in the early stages as of the writing of this Article. In State v.
Anthony Enriquez,98 State v. Marcus Dawson,99 State v. Michael Finley,1oo

95. Id. at 11-13 (citations omitted).
96. These figures were compiled by an expert in Nevada who was retained by the class
of Aiken petitioners for purposes of their resentencing hearings.
97. State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 355-56, 46 S.E. 273, 276-77 (1948).
98. State v. Anthony Enriquez, 1994-GS-10-3056 (General Sessions, Charleston
County, Oct. 13, 2016) (J. Mullen).
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and State v. Rodney Mollins,'0' resentencing was denied because the
defendants received sentences of life with parole. While this may seem
logical as an initial matter, research is presently being conducted on whether
the possibility of parole for the crime of murder, in reality in South Carolina,
provides any meaningful opportunity for release from prison one day. In
other words, while inmates serving time for relatively minor crimes have an
expectation they may make parole, it is unclear that a person convicted of
murder has any meaningful expectation of ever being released on parole.
Hopefully, research presently being conducted will answer that question in
the years ahead.
In State v. Anthony Willis, the defendant was sentenced to life without
parole on September 19, 2012.102 He was resentenced to thirty-eight years
imprisonment on November 21, 2016, following the Aiken resentencing
hearing. In State v. Roger Legette, the defendant was sentenced to life
without parole on August 5, 1997.103 A negotiated sentence of thirty years
was to be the result of the resentencing. However, the judge sentenced
Legette to forty years imprisonment, and then granted the defense counsel's
motion to withdraw.
In regards to post-Aiken individualized sentencing proceedings, in State
v. Trenton Barnes, the circuit court judge sentenced the juvenile defendant to
a fifty years' imprisonment for a high profile murder of a woman working
the night shift at an off-site bakery.104 In State v. Tavoris Settles, the
defendant received forty-year concurrent sentences for crimes in Greenwood
05
and Abbeville Counties.

The Aiken resentencing and individualized sentencing hearings will be
watched with great interest in the years ahead, particularly as they involve
the sentencing court giving meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence

99. State v. Marcus Dawson, 1990-GS-23-2177 (General Sessions, Greenville County,
June 30, 2016) (J. Hill).
100. State v. Michael Finley, 1992-GS-23-01420 (General Sessions, Greenville County,
November 21, 2016) (J. Sprouse).
101. Rodney Mollins v. State, 1993-GS-32-607 (General Sessions, Lexington County,
Sept. 20, 2016) (J. Hocker).
102. State v. Willis, 2011-GS-18-0613 (General Sessions, Dorchester County, Nov. 21,
2016) (J. Nettles).
103. State v. Legette, 1996-GS-26-2809 (General Sessions, Horry County, Aug. 5, 1997)
(J. Hyman).
104. State v. Barnes, 2014-GS-40-752 (General Sessions, Richland County, Dec. 12,
2014) (J. Hood).
105. State v. Settles, 2013-GS-24-1538; 1539 (General Sessions, Greenwood County,
Sept. 18, 2015) (J. Addy).
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pertaining to the hallmarks of youth and a sentence that provides a
meaningful opportunity for release from prison someday in the future.
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